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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1999, a Northeastern University freshman needed only a quiet dorm 
room to design the catalyst that would spark the peer-to-peer (P2P)1 
                                                                                                                     
 * Editor’s Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for Best Note of the 2009–2010 
academic year. 
 ** J.D. expected 2010, University of Florida Levin College of law; B.S. in computer 
engineering, University of Florida. I would like to thank Brandon Richardson, my Note Advisor, for 
his tireless efforts and for putting up with my constant revisions. Special thanks to Professor Jeffrey 
Harrison for the thoughtful comments and insightful suggestions, Jon Philipson and all the members 
of the Florida Law Review, and of course my family. Without their constant love, support, and 
encouragement, I would not be who I am today. 
 1. Generally, P2P is a method of sharing computer files directly between two individuals 
over the Internet, without the use of an intermediary server. See BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 179–80 (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER] (describing how a 
non-P2P file transfer using an intermediary server works). Because P2P eliminates the server 
“middle man,” it “is among the most efficient of the efficient technologies the Internet enables.” 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK 
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY  17 (2004). More technically, P2P is a distributed 
(parallel or non-hierarchical) network that requires no central computer server to act as a broker 
1
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downloading phenomenon.2 That freshman, the then-teenaged Shawn 
Fanning, spawned the now-infamous computer program Napster—a 
program that facilitated the free transfer of MP33 files between any two 
individuals anywhere in the world.4 Napster was widely accessible to the 
public, available as a free download on the Internet, and required only a 
simple subscription to utilize the software.5 
Although P2P had existed for many years,6 Napster distinguished itself 
with its foresight and innovative design. It “combined the practicality of 
sharing personal music and finding MP3s online with the community 
features of Internet Relay Chat,” a chat room interface popular with the 
computer-savvy.7 Importantly, Napster “provide[d] media fans with a 
forum to communicate their interests and tastes with one another . . . .”8
As a free and fast way to get your favorite music, Napster quickly 
became popular, gaining ten million users within nine months of its July 
1999 launch date.9 Merely a year and a half after its launch, Napster 
garnered nearly eighty million users.10 The record companies were not 
amused when after the release of Napster, CD sales fell as much as thirty 
                                                                                                                     
between the transferor and transferee. See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-
Peer Technology, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1020 (2002). All individuals participating in the 
P2P network are equals, and each individual acts as both client and server. Id. at 1021. Thus, a 
“many-to-many” (or “peer-to-peer”) relationship exists in which each individual computer is a 
“peer” of all other computers on the network. Id. P2P’s basic architectural configuration eliminates 
the lag generated by transacting with an intermediary server, and allows for direct high-bandwidth 
communications between the transferor and transferee, making the transaction extremely efficient. 
See id. at 1022–23. At the heart of all P2P-providing computer programs, however, is an algorithm 
for connecting the individual users so that they may transfer files between each other. There are two 
popular ways to do this: Supernode and Decentralized Node. For a detailed description of these two 
architectures, see infra Part III.A. 
 2. Jefferson Graham, Entertainment Firms Win File-Sharing Duel—Court Rules Sites Could 
Be Held Liable for Piracy, USA TODAY, June 28, 2005, at 1B. 
 3. “MP3,” also known as MPEG-1 Audio Layer 3, is a compressed digital audio storage 
standard created by the Moving Picture Experts Group that is popular for its small size and ability 
to maintain near CD-quality sound.  See JESSICA LITMAN , DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 154 (2001). MP3 is 
merely a file format for digital audio recordings, which may be used for infringing and unauthorized 
recordings, but also may be used for many legitimate uses. Se  id. Record companies dislike the 
MP3 format because MP3 is an non–secure standard that provides no copy protection, from which 
files could be copied ad infinitum. Id. 
 4. Napster allowed a user to download MP3 files directly from another user free of charge, 
without checking to see whether the MP3 files transferred were copyrighted material. See infra Part 
III.A for a more detailed discussion of how Napster functioned.  
 5. See LITMAN , supra note 3, at 158. 
 6. See, e.g., A Brief(ish) History of P2P, http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/fall02/moody/histo 
ry.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2009). 
 7. MATTHEW RIMMER, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT AND THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION 93 (2007). 
 8. Id. 
 9. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 67. 
 10. LESSIG, supra note 1, at 67. 
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percent.11 Seeing the CD sales market hastily eroded12 by what it viewed as 
“rampant piracy,”13 the recording industry sought the help of its trade 
group, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA).14 In an 
effort to stop or even reverse the effects of the P2P craze, the RIAA first 
turned to Congress15 and then to the courts16 for relief. Eventually, the 
RIAA turned its litigious eyes toward the individual infringers, relying on 
the exclusive right of distribution granted to copyright holders by the 
Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act).17 In the process, the RIAA tested 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Jefferson Graham, RIAA Chief Says Illegal Song-Sharing ‘Contained’-Double-Digit 
Piracy Growth Hits Hollywood, Though, USA TODAY, June 13, 2006, at 1B. However, some have 
questioned whether illegal downloading was actually a major cause of the drop in album sales. See 
Jane Black, Big Music’s Broken Record, BUS. WK. ONLINE, Feb. 13, 2003, available at 2003 
WLNR 12391939. For example, one reason sales dropped may have been due to a 20–25% 
decrease in new albums released between 1999 (38,900 new albums released) and 2001 (27,000–
31,734 new albums released). Id. Another reason may be the rise in average CD price in the same 
period from $13.04 in 1999 to $14.19 in 2001, an increase of 7.2%. Id. Yet another reason could be 
that in 2002, “35% of U.S. homes had a DVD player, up from zero just three years” earlier. Id. 
DVD prices seemed cheap in comparison: the soundtrack to the film High Fidelity, for instance, 
was $18.98, but you could purchase the entire movie on DVD for $19.99. Id  Rapidly increasing 
DVD sales caused even more problems for the recording industry. Id.  
 12. Record companies built their business models entirely upon the distribution of tangible 
copies of music. Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1013. Record companies were concerned that if 
anyone could access a “comprehensive recorded library of music” from anywhere at any time, then 
nobody would need tangible copies of music. Id. 
 13. Graham, supra note 11, at 1B. What was most threatening to the recording industry was 
not that P2P facilitates copying—copying has been going on in tangible media for as long as 
recordable media have been around. Rather, it was P2P’s distribution capability, which “directly 
undermine[d] content owners’ control of their product.” Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1039.  
 14. The RIAA is the self-proclaimed trade group that represents the major record companies 
in the United States. See RIAA, Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Oct. 
10, 2009). The RIAA is also an “extraordinarily powerful” lobbying group, reportedly paying its 
president “more than $1 million a year.” LESSIG, supra note 1, at 52.  
 15. See, e.g., Competition, Innovation, and Public Policy in the Digital Age: Is the 
Marketplace Working to Protect Digital Creative Works?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (written statement of Hilary B. Rosen, President and CEO, 
Recording Industry Association of America), vailable at http://judiciary.senate.gov/resources/ 
transcripts/107transcripts.cfm. 
 16. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster II), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(resolving a conflict between record companies and the P2P provider Napster). Even though 
copyright infringement is a criminal offense, federal prosecutors have been reluctant to go after 
individual infringers for lack of resources, among other reasons. Lorenza Munoz & Jon Healey, 
Crackdown on Piracy Hits Barrier; Federal Prosecutors Are Reluctant to Go After Typical 
Downloaders of Music and Movies, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 2005, at C.1. Thus, when the RIAA 
brought civil actions against infringers, it suffered the bills of litigation. Id. 
 17. Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1976 as an attempt to overhaul the United States 
copyright laws to adhere to the Berne Convention .  Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 
Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1301 (2006)).  See 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, 
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 1:72 (Sept. 2008). One of the most notable changes within the Copyright 
Act was that a work became copyrighted upon creation and fixation , rather than registration. See id. 
§ 1:82. As a structural matter, the Copyright Act granted unrestricted rights to copyright owners in 
3
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the limits of the distribution right and turned the case law interpreting that 
right upside-down. 
Today, P2P litigation “present[s] one of the thorniest practical 
problems” in copyright law.18 Not only are individuals confused and 
misled about which actions are illegal and which are fair use,19 but the 
courts even disagree about the current state of copyright holders’  rights in 
the aftermath of the Internet revolution.20 In the past, Congress had simply 
modified existing copyright law every time there was a new technological 
advance that potentially threatened the rights of copyright holders.21 Since 
the massive overhaul of copyright law in 1976,22 Congress has amended 
the law more than fifty times.23 However, the recent “problems posed by 
the Internet are themselves more numerous—and reach farther into 
copyright law and policy—than those raised by earlier technology.”24 In 
light of current judicial struggles with Internet technology, it has become 
“difficult and awkward to adapt the specific statutory provisions to 
comport with the [copyright] law’ s principles,” and therefore, it is time for 
Congress to make a change.25  
This Note analyzes the current legal climate of P2P litigation, 
specifically regarding the distribution right of 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), and 
argues that Congress should amend the Copyright Act once again to 
encompass digital transmissions and any future means of transmissions not 
yet thought of or invented. Part II of this Note offers a brief historical 
account of P2P litigation, with emphasis on the cases involving individual 
infringers. To assist in understanding many of the legal issues surrounding 
P2P and digital transmissions, Part III provides a technical overview of 
                                                                                                                     
§ 106, subject only to the limitations set forth in subsequent sections of the Copyright Act. Id. 
§ 8:22. One of the exclusive rights of § 106 is the right of distribution.  See Copyright Act of 1976 
§ 106(3). 
 18. Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1002; see also Michael W. Carroll, The Struggle for Music 
Copyright, 57 FLA. L. REV. 907, 911–12 (2005) (“[D]isputes about music copyright rank among the 
most pressing issues of the day in contemporary intellectual property law.”). 
 19. For a discussion of the applicability of fair use to the distribution right, see infra note 110. 
 20. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–53 (1997) (recounting in detail the history of the 
Internet and its “extraordinary growth”). 
 21. LITMAN , supra note 3, at 23; see also Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1005 (“Nearly every 
technological advance touching copyright has required revision of the copyright laws.”). 
 22. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101–1301 (2006)). For further discussion of the overhaul of the Copyright Act, see supra 
note 17. 
 23. Between 1976 and October 2007, Congress amended the Copyright Act fifty-nine times. 
See Preface to Copyright Act, http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92preface.pdf. 
 24. Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1011; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 
FLA. L. REV. 763, 772 (2003) (“[Copyright] law has been responding to changes in the technology 
of distribution since the turn of the last century. But until the Internet, the law’s response to this 
change has been consistent and appropriately conservative.”). 
 25. WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 211. 
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how P2P works and how the RIAA gathers evidence for litigation. Part IV 
outlines what constitutes copyright infringement and introduces copyright 
terms. Part V surveys legal authority and illustrates that a digital 
distribution, like all other distributions, requires actual dissemination of the 
copyrighted works. Part VI addresses the technological dissonance between 
current copyright law and digital distributions. Finally, Part VII argues that 
by amending the Copyright Act once again, Congress may finally resolve 
this dissonance and reinforce the Copyright Act against current and future 
problems associated with technology. 
II.   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF P2P LITIGATION  
P2P litigation was born on December 7, 1999, when the RIAA banded 
together a few record companies and filed suit against Napster for 
contributory and vicarious copyright infringement.26 This first attempt to 
quell P2P piracy was a resounding victory for the RIAA and its 
constituents, as the District Court for the Northern District of California 
(Napster I)27 and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Napster II)28 agreed 
that Napster infringed the record companies’  copyrights. Both courts 
issued a preliminary injunction with which Napster was unable to comply 
while continuing to operate its file-sharing network, and Napster 
eventually ceased operations.29 The RIAA aimed this and many subsequent 
P2P lawsuits at the computer programs that facilitated individual 
infringement, sparing users of those programs from legal trouble.30 The 
insulation of individual users from legal action, however, did not last long. 
The RIAA began its “education and enforcement campaign”31 i  the 
summer of 2003 when it filed more than 1600 subpoenas to Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs)32 across the country requesting personal 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Complaint for Contributory and Vicarious Copyright Infringement, Violations of 
California Civil Code Section 980(a)(2), and Unfair Competition at 2, A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc. (Napster I),114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (No. C99-5183-MHP), http://w2. 
eff.org/IP/P2P/Napster/napster_complaint. 
pdf. Although the plaintiffs listed in P2P litigation are individual record companies, the RIAA 
actually litigates these lawsuits. See Ray Beckerman, Content Holders vs. the Web: 2008 US 
Copyright Law Victories Point to Robust Internet, J. INTERNET L., Jan. 2009, at 16, 16 n.2. The 
plaintiffs listed are those that own the specific copyrights in question. See id. at 16 n.2. 
 27. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I), 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 896–911 (N.D. Cal. 
2000). 
 28. Napster II, 239 F.3d. 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 29. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
Napster officially shut down operations on July 1, 2001. Id. 
 30. The other P2P providers the RIAA has sued are Scour, Aimster, AudioGalaxy, Morpheus, 
Grokster, Kazaa, iMesh, and LimeWire. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, RIAA  V. THE PEOPLE: 
FIVE YEARS LATER 1, http://www.eff.org/files/eff-riaa-whitepaper.pdf. 
 31. Nick Wingfield & Nick Baker, RIAA Targets Are Surprised by Piracy Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 10, 2003, at B2.  
 32. An ISP is a company that provides its customers with access to the Internet. Normally a 
5
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information about some of the ISPs’  subscribers.33 Along with the 
subpoenas, the RIAA offered amnesty to all individuals not currently under 
investigation if they took certain steps to show good faith.34 On September 
8, 2003, not long after the first round of subpoenas, the RIAA departed 
from its historical litigation strategy and filed 261 lawsuits against 
individual infringers across the United States.35 In bringing legal action 
against these 261 individuals, the RIAA sought to target major offenders: 
those sharing an average of 1000 digital songs through various P2P 
computer programs.36 Caught in the RIAA’ s net, among others, was a 
twelve-year-old girl from Manhattan, a 71-year-old grandfather from 
Texas, and a father-and-son combo.37 Some were not even aware they were 
defendants to a lawsuit until questioned by reporters.38 Others did not even 
know that downloading copyrighted music online was illegal.39 Most 
defendants, however, quickly settled.40 
                                                                                                                     
division of the local cable or telephone company, an ISP similarly maintains databases of the 
personal information of its customers. 
 33. Jefferson Graham, Music Industry Files First Wave of Lawsuits Against Swappers, USA 
TODAY, Sept. 9, 2003, at 6D. 
 34. Nick Wingfield & Ethan Smith, The High Cost of Sharing—Record Industry Files Suits 
Against 261 Music Uploaders; Move May Alienate Customers, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at B1. 
To be free from the legal scrutiny of the RIAA, individuals could sign an affidavit promising to 
delete all illegal copies of songs from their computers and to refrain from illegally downloading 
music. Id. However, some criticized the amnesty program as not actually insulating the participants 
from legal action. See, e.g., Paul Boutin, An Offer You Can Refuse, SLATE, Sept. 8, 2003, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2088066/. 
 35. Frank Ahrens, Music Industry Sues Online Song Swappers; Trade Group Says First 
Batch of Lawsuits Targets 261 Major Offenders, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1. The list of 
plaintiffs for each lawsuit was different, depending upon the claimed infringed music, but at least 
one member of the five largest music companies (Vivendi Universal SA’s Universal Music Group, 
Bertelsmann AG’s BMG Music, AOL Time Warner Inc.’s Warner Music, EMI Group PLC, and 
Sony Corp.’s Sony Music Entertainment) was always a plaintiff. Wingfield & Smith, supranote 34, 
at B8. 
 36. Ahrens, supra note 35, at A5. 
 37. Lorena Mongelli, Music Pirate: N.Y. Girl, 12, Sued for Web Songs Theft, N.Y. POST, 
Sept. 9, 2003, at 1. The girl, Brianna LaHara, and her mother, Sylvia Torres, quickly settled with 
the RIAA for $2000. Frank Ahrens, RIAA’s Lawsuits Meet Surprised Targets; Single Mother in 
Calif., 12-Year-Old Girl in N.Y. Among Defendants, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, at E3. 
 38. Wingfield & Baker, supra note 31, at B1.  
 39. Wingfield & Baker, supra note 31, at B1. 
 40. Eriq Gardner, Seeking Order in the Court: Setbacks Emerge in Legal Battles Against File 
Sharers, BILLBOARD , Oct. 11, 2008, at 11. Settlements with the RIAA average between $4000 and 
$4500. Neil Graves, College Students Face Mu$ic Over Downloads, N.Y. POST, Mar. 22, 2007, at 
10. In view of the minimum statutory damages amount of $750 per song, and a maximum of 
$30,000 per song, see 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006), settlement is in the best interest of most 
alleged infringers, especially parents sued as a result of their children’s file sharing. See Janelle A. 
Weber, Note, Don’t Drink, Don’t Smoke, Don’t Download: Parents’ Liability for Their Children’s 
File Sharing, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1163, 1198 (2005) (“[A] plaintiff might be able to hold a parent liable 
for his child’s unauthorized file sharing under the doctrine of contributory infringement.”). 
6
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At first, the RIAA’ s tactics seemed to work, as there was a “marked 
decline in file-sharing in the months following the highly-publicized first 
rounds of RIAA lawsuits.”41 Some universities immediately instituted 
measures to protect themselves and their students from potential lawsuits.42 
The lawsuits even garnered some admonishment from pop-culture musical 
satirist Weird Al Yankovic.43 However, merely a year after the RIAA’ s 
initial lawsuits, ensuing lawsuits were hardly newsworthy. At that time, 
twenty-three million people continued to engage in P2P activities, slightly 
more than the number of people doing so before the summer of 2003.44 
Although people were generally better educated on copyright law than 
before the lawsuits, many continued engaging in illegal P2P activities.45 
In the ensuing years, album sales continued to fall46 nd P2P activity 
                                                                                                                     
Defendants could easily pay settlements at a convenient website managed by the RIAA. See Posting 
of Eliot Van Buskirk to Listening Post, http://www.wired.com/listening_post/2007/02/riaa_launch 
es_p/ (Feb. 28, 2007, 09:24 EST). An accused infringer need only supply his or her MasterCard, 
Visa, or Discover card and a case identification number to ensure avoidance of a lawsuit. See 
Posting of Meg Marco to The Consumerist, http://consumerist.com/consumer/riaa/riaa-bullies-
college-students-with-p2plawsuitscom-240877.php (Mar. 1, 2007 17:22 EST). Unfortunately, the 
RIAA has since removed the website from the Internet. For a sample settlement agreement, see 
http://w2.eff.org/IP/P2P/RIAA_v_ThePeople/JohnDoe/Form_of_Doe_Settlement_Agreement.pdf. 
 41. Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea? (Sept. 29, 2004), 
http://www.boycott-riaa.com/article/14369.  
 42. See, e.g., UF Unleashes Tool Against File-Sharing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 24, 
2003, at 4D.  
 43. Weird Al Yankovic released a song entitled “Don’t Download this Song” that made a few 
jokes about the RIAA and their litigation practices. Wired Blogs, Weird Al: ‘Don’t Download this 
Song’, http://blog.wired.com/music/2006/08/weird_al_dont_d.html (Aug. 22, 2006, 18:37 EST). 
Ironically, the song was available for a short time as a free download at the website 
DontDownloadThisSong.com. Id. One verse of the song begins, “Oh, you don’t wanna mess with 
the R-I-double-A; They’ll sue you if you burn that CD-R; It doesn’t matter if you’re a grandma or a 
seven year old girl; They’ll treat you like the evil hard-bitten criminal scum you are.” WEIRD AL 
YANKOVIC , Don’t Download this Song, on STRAIGHT OUTTA LYNWOOD (Volcano Entertainment 
2006), available at http://www.com-www.com/weirdal/dontdownloadthissong.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2009). 
 44. Laura Petrecca, The Song Remains the Same; Downloaders Ignoring RIAA’s Legal 
Threats, N.Y. POST, Oct. 3, 2004, at 30. Although not all P2P activities are illegal, a vast majority 
of P2P users engage in illegal activities. See MARY MADDEN &  AMANDA LENHART, PEW INTERNET 
PROJECT DATA MEMO RE: MUSIC DOWNLOADING, FILE-SHARING AND COPYRIGHT 7–8, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2003/PIP_Copyright_Memo.pdf.pdf. 
 45. See von Lohmann, supra note 41 (referencing an April 2004 study “reveal[ing] that 88 
percent of children between 8 and 18 years of age understood that P2P music-downloading is 
illegal” but noting that of the children surveyed, “56 percent . . . continue[d] to download music 
anyway”). 
 46. Graham, supra note 11. There are other explanations for the decrease in album sales over 
the years, such as the advent of legitimate online music stores, such as Apple’s iTunes. iTunes is a 
pay-per-song online store where users can purchase individual songs for 99 cents to $1.29 or entire 
albums for about $9.99. See Apple, iTunes, What’s on iTunes?, http://www.apple.com/itunes/whats 
on/music.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). As of September 2008, iTunes had over sixty-five 
7
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continued to grow.47 In an effort to stop the hemorrhaging of nearly $12.5 
billion in lost revenue due to copyright infringement of music,48 the RIAA 
began to target specific groups of individuals (such as college students)49 
and became more aggressive in its litigation strategies.50  
Beginning in September 2003, the RIAA routinely filed several hundred 
lawsuits in federal courts each month.51 By February 2006, the RIAA had 
sued 17,587 individuals and subsequently stopped making monthly 
announcements regarding the number of suits filed.52 Although this made it 
impossible to know exactly how many individuals the RIAA has sued, it is 
estimated that the RIAA has filed, settled, or threatened legal action against 
more than 35,000 individuals to date.53 Considering the RIAA’ s win-loss 
                                                                                                                     
million customer accounts, and was the top music distributor in any format in the United States, 
beating out Wal-Mart, Best Buy, and Amazon.com. Steve Jobs, Apple CEO, Special Event Keynote 
Speech (Sept. 2008) (recording available at http://events.apple.com.edgesuite.net/0809dt4bs89/ev 
ent/index.html) (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). It should be noted that “the typical share for the major 
[record companies] on each 99 cent download [from iTunes] is . . . about 70 cents.” JOHN LOGIE, 
PEERS, PIRATES, &  PERSUASION 122 (2006). The record companies, however, contend that these 
gains in digital sales aren’t enough to offset losses in physical album sales. See U.S. Music Sales 
Drop 6.2% in ‘06, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at C2. Notwithstanding the impact iTunes and other 
similar stores may have had on the market, losses in album sales may be attributed to other causes. 
See supra note 11; George Ziemann, RIAA’s Statistics Don’t Add Up to Piracy (Dec. 11, 2002), 
http://www.azoz.com/music/features/0008.html (collecting the potential causes for the decrease in 
album sales). 
 47. BigChampagne, an online media and network measuring and monitoring service, 
estimated “that the amount of traffic on P2P networks doubled between September 2003 . . . and 
June 2005.” ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 9. 
 48. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, POLICY REPORT 188: THE TRUE COST OF SOUND RECORDING PIRACY TO 
THE U.S. ECONOMY (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.ipi.org (follow “Publications” hyperlink; 
then follow “All IPI Publications—by Date” hyperlink; then follow “2007” hyperlink; then follow 
“The True Cost of Sound Recording Piracy to the U.S. Economy” hyperlink; then follow “Full Text 
PDF” hyperlink). However, these numbers may be inaccurate, as there are some instances in which 
“the impact of piracy on the copyright holder’s ability to appropriate the value of the work will be 
negligible.” STAN LIEBOWITZ, RE-THINKING THE NETWORK ECONOMY 149 (2002). One instance that 
implicitly applies in the context of file sharing is “the case where the individual engaging in pirating 
would not have purchased an original even if pirating were not an option.” Id.  
 49. See, e.g., Graves, supra note 40. The RIAA started its “deterrence and education 
initiative” on February 28, 2007, which targeted college students across the nation. ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 7. The RIAA specifically targeted young people because 
it is estimated that more than half of all college students engage in illegal P2P downloading activity, 
and account for nearly 1.3 billion illegal downloads annually. Thomas Kaplan, Music Industry 
Zealous in Tracking Tune Thieves, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 20, 2008, at 1B. 
 50. Sarah McBride, Arrest Signals Tougher Stance on Music Piracy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 
2008, at B6. 
 51. Sarah McBride, Corporate News: Music File-Sharing Decision to Have Broad Impact—If 
New Trial Is Granted, Copyright Violations May Be Harder to Prove, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2008, 
at B4. 
 52. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 4. 
 53. Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 
19, 2008, at B1.  
8
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/9
2009] P2P LITIGATION 1173 
 
percentage based on known figures, the lawsuits seem to have been “wildly 
successful,” as most defendants tend to settle for amounts less than the cost 
of defending the lawsuits.54 Other defendants default due to lack of 
knowledge of the charges against them, lack of resources to defend the 
lawsuit55 or lack of lawyers56 adept at dealing with the RIAA’ s lawsuit 
process.57 In all, only about 5% of the targeted individuals decide to fight 
back.58 Of those that do, some have had success in getting the RIAA to 
dismiss its claims59 and some have even been able to recoup attorney’ s 
fees.60 However, for others, like Jammie Thomas of Duluth, Minnesota, 
fighting back ended in a jury award of $1.92 million in favor of the 
plaintiffs.61 
                                                                                                                     
 54. von Lohmann, supra note 41. 
 55. von Lohmann, supra note 41. 
 56. See Recording Industry vs. The People, Directory of Lawyers Defending RIAA Lawsuits, 
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/directory.htm (listing lawyers who are actively defending against the 
RIAA’s P2P lawsuits) (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 57. See Ray Beckerman, How the RIAA Litigation Process Works, 
http://info.riaalawsuits.us/howriaa_printable.htm (describing in detail how the RIAA’s litigation 
process works) (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 58. Id.  
 59. See, e.g., Notice of Voluntary Dismissal at 1, Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Cassin, No. 
06-cv-3089 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 2008) (voluntarily dismissing claims against defendant), 
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename=warner_cassin_080605NoticeOfDismiss 
alSoOrdered. 
 60. See, e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Andersen, No. CV 05-933 AC, 2008 WL 2536834, 
at *20 (D. Or. June 24, 2008) (granting attorney’s fees to the defendant in the amount of $103,175); 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Foster, No. 04-1569-W, slip op. at 14 (W.D. Okla. July 16, 2007), 
available at http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDFfull.asp?filename=capitol_foster_070716Order 
AwardAttys Fees (granting attorney’s fees to the defendant in the amount of $68,685.23). 
 61. In the first iteration of the trial, the jury found Thomas liable for 24 counts of willful 
infringement to the tune of $9,250 per infringement. Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 
2d 1210, 1213 (D. Minn. 2008). Subsequently, Judge Davis sua sponte ordered a new trial and 
vacated the judgment of $222,000. Id. at 1228. Prior to deliberation, Judge Davis instructed the jury 
with Jury Instruction No. 15, which stated, “[t]he act of making copyrighted sound recordings 
available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer network, without license from the copyright 
owners, violates the copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual 
distribution has been shown.” Id. at 1213. After judgment, Judge Davis ordered a new trial based on 
Jury Instruction No. 15 being manifest error because he believed “[l]iability for violation of the 
exclusive distribution right . . . requires actual dissemination.” Id. at 1226–27. Furthermore, Judge 
Davis noted that the 
damages awarded . . . [were] wholly disproportionate to the damages suffered 
by Plaintiffs. Thomas allegedly infringed on the copyrights of 24 songs—the 
equivalent of approximately three CDs, costing less than $54, and yet the total 
damages awarded [was] $222,000—more than five hundred times the cost of 
buying 24 separate CDs and more than four thousand times the cost of three 
CDs. 
Id. at 1227. Upon retrial, a new jury found Thomas liable for 24 counts of willful infringement, as 
before. Nate Anderson, Thomas Verdict: Willful Infringement, $1.92 Million Penalty, Ars Technica, 
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Eventually, some music industry officials, tired of the incessant 
lawsuits, sought simpler solutions.62 Despite this perceived calm in the 
storm, the RIAA continues to routinely bring lawsuits against individuals.63 
With the end of P2P litigation nowhere in sight, it is important to 
understand the lasting effects P2P litigation has left on the distribution 
right because the legal issues raised in this litigation apply to any question 
of digital distribution now and in the future. To understand these effects, 
and the issues that remain unanswered, the technological nature of P2P 
distribution must be addressed first. 
III.   THE TECHNOLOGICAL BARRIER 
A.  P2P Architectures 
Prior to the September 2003 lawsuits, the RIAA exclusively targeted 
the computer programs (Napster, Grokster, and the like) that facilitated the 
P2P transfers of their subscribers. Those computer programs generally 
employed a centralized P2P architecture, sometimes known as Supernode. 
Supernode is a P2P architecture that creates a pyramidal network of 
computers with a central computer server (the “supernode”)64 at the top of 
the pyramid.65 This supernode maintains a list of all users connected to the 
P2P network and the files that each user makes available to other users on 
the P2P network.66 With this information, the supernode constructs a 
master search index of all files available on the P2P network and publishes 
                                                                                                                     
June 18, 2009, available at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/06/jammie-thomas-
retrial-verdict.ars. This jury, however, awarded damages in the amount of $80,000 per infringement, 
bringing the grand total to just under $2 million. Id.  
 62. As Warner Music CEO Edgar Bronfman stated at an August 22, 2005, industry summit: 
[T]he war between the music companies and consumers has been fought. We 
lost. Okay? So, let’s just move on. Which is to say, we’ve got to make our 
music available to people. We just need to be allowed to have a business model 
that allows copyright holders and owners to be compensated for their work. 
But our job is to get music to everyone, everywhere, as readily and as 
seamlessly as possible. 
LOGIE, supra note 46, at 122. 
 63. See, e.g., Eliot Van Buskirk, Nothing to See Here: RIAA Lawsuits Continue, Wired.com, 
May 6, 2009, available at http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/05/nothing-to-see-here-riaa-
lawsuits-continue/ (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). 
 64. For simplicity, I will use the capitalized “Supernode” to refer to the P2P architecture 
and the lowercase “supernode” to refer to the central computer server within the larger 
“Supernode” architecture. 
 65. See Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Legal Realism in Action: Indirect Copyright 
Liability’s Continuing Tort Framework and Sony’s De Facto Demise, 55 UCLA L. REV. 143, 183 
(2007). 
 66. See, e.g., Jeffrey C. J. Lee, The Ongoing Design Duty in Universal Music Australia Pty 
Ltd v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd—Casting the Scope of Copyright Infringement Even Wider, 
15 INT’L J.L. &  INFO. TECH. 275, 276–77 (2006). 
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that index to each of its users.67 The supernode does not physically 
maintain any computer files; however, the available files remain on a 
respective user’ s computer.68 When one user wants to search for a 
particular file, that user submits a query to the supernode, which in turn 
searches its master search index for the requested file.69 I  the supernode 
finds the requested file in its master search index, the supernode sends the 
location of the user in possession of the requested file to the requesting 
user so that the two may directly connect to each other and privately 
transfer files.70 
In this P2P scheme, the parent corporations of the P2P software 
generally control and maintain the supernode.71 Based on this control and 
maintenance, the RIAA targeted the parent corporations in early P2P 
litigation, arguing that the corporations’  publishing of available files 
facilitated the alleged infringement of the program’ s users.72 The 
Supernode architecture caused liability to be directed at the parent 
corporation, usually a single defendant with deep pockets, and the RIAA 
often prevailed.73 As the RIAA began to gain leverage over the parent 
corporations, however, software developers designed a new P2P 
architecture known as “Decentralized Node” in an attempt to avoid 
contributory and derivative liability.74 
The Decentralized Node P2P architecture75 creates a freeform 
                                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., id. 
 68. See, e.g., id. 
 69. See, e.g., Stephen Bates, Coming Soon to a P.C. Near You: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Movie Copyright Infringement on the Internet, 5 VA. SPORTS &  ENT. L.J. 97, 114 (2005). 
 70. See, e.g., id. 
 71.  MICHAEL PIATEK, TADAYOSHI KOHNO, &  ARVIND KRISHNAMURTHY, UNIVERSITY OF 
WASHINGTON TECHNICAL REPORT: CHALLENGES AND DIRECTIONS FOR MONITORING P2P FILE 
SHARING NETWORKS—OR—WHY MY PRINTER RECEIVED A DMCA TAKEDOWN NOTICE 1 (2008), 
available at http://dmca.cs.washington.edu/uwcse_dmca_tr.pdf. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) 
(holding that the parent corporation Grokster was liable for the infringing acts of its users); Napster 
II , 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the parent corporation Napster was liable for the 
infringing acts of its users).  
 74. See PIATEK ET. AL., supra note 71, at 1. This transition from a centralized architecture to a 
decentralized architecture is nothing revolutionary considering the transition of P2P designs over 
the years. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 n.4 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(“The history of peer-to-peer networks has been one of increasing decentralization, and thus, 
increasing anonymity.”) (citation omitted).  
 75. Decentralized Node has a few versions. One version, Gnutella, is a vanilla incarnation 
that functions exactly as described herein. See Marshall Brain, How Gnutella Works, Gnutella’s 
Architecture, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/file-sharing2.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
Another version, BitTorrent, combines principles of Supernode and Decentralized Node. In 
particular, it utilizes centralized servers, but only to the extent that those centralized servers collect 
the IP addresses of all clients on the network. BitTorrent, The Basics of BitTorrent, 
http://www.bittorrent.com/btusers/guides/bittorrent-user-manual/chapter-02-basic-guides/basics-
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relationship (as opposed to the pyramidal relationship of Supernode 
architecture) between individual users so that there is no centralized server 
and each user is an equal peer of all other users. When a user performs a 
search request for a particular file, the requesting user searches among all 
other users in a distributed fashion76 to find that file. If the search returns a 
match, the requesting user directly connects to the user in possession of the 
requested file.77 This architecture gives users anonymity from those not 
part of the file exchange because users communicate directly between each 
other and without any interaction with a centralized server.78 The only 
practical way to observe a transfer of files is to be a party to that transfer.79 
Because in Decentralized Node the parent corporation no longer facilitates 
the alleged infringement, the RIAA must instead direct any legal action at 
P2P users individually.80 
Enforcing copyright restrictions in Decentralized Node is extremely 
difficult because no information flows through an easily observable 
centralized server. The potentially infringing files flow directly between 
users, and there are too many infringers to realistically (and cost 
efficiently) track the transfer of information between those users. The 
Internet is an unfathomably large collection of networks through which 
information travels between two individuals via constantly changing 
routes.81 It would be impossible to monitor each of these networks and 
wait for a potentially infringing use. The RIAA therefore changed its 
monitoring strategy and began directly connecting to potentially infringing 
users and acting as another P2P user in order to “witness” an infringing 
distribution.82 The RIAA does this with the help of a company called 
MediaSentry.83 
                                                                                                                     
bittorrent (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). Other than that distinction, BitTorrent functions just like the 
basic Decentralized Node architecture. S e id. 
 76. For a simple description of how a Distributed Node architecture, Gnutella, searches its 
nodes, see Marshall Brain, How Gnutella Works, Gnutella Clients, http://computer.howstuff 
works.com/file-sharing3.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 77. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of 
Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505, 516 (2003). 
 78. See, e.g., id. at 517. 
 79. See, e.g., Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, 
and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1761, 1782 & 
n.135 (2001). 
 80. See PIATEK, ET AL., supra note 71, at 1. 
 81. For a brief description of how the Internet works, see Jeff Tyson, How Internet 
Infrastructure Works, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure.htm (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2009). 
 82. Catherine Rampell, How It Does It: The RIAA Explains How It Catches Alleged Music 
Pirates, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May 13, 2008, available at http://chronicle.com/article/How-It-
Does-It-The-RIAA-Ex/786/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 83. Id. 
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B.  MediaSentry 
MediaSentry runs copies of popular P2P programs as an “undercover” 
user and searches for copyrighted songs one at a time to see if they are 
available for download from other users.84 If the search returns a result, 
MediaSentry connects to that user to determine the user’ s IP address85 and 
subsequently initiates a TCP86 connection to “handshake” with the user to 
determine if the user is online and ready to share the file.87 The TCP 
“handshake” never actually downloads the song but only confirms that the 
song is legitimate and available.88 MediaSentry then uses free online 
databases to determine the ISP to which an IP address belongs.89 Finally, 
MediaSentry forwards this information to the RIAA, which determines 
whether to sue the infringing user by way of the ISP.90 
There are many shortfalls in using this method of investigation. For 
instance, the RIAA only knows when a user offers a song for other users to 
download and has no way of knowing when a user is actually distributing 
that song.91 As will be discussed in Part V, the mere offer to distribute is 
not enough for copyright infringement liability—only actual distribution is 
                                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. An IP address is a unique “locator declaring the place of a particular piece of electronic 
equipment so that electronic data may be sent to it, and is usually represented as a series of four 
numbers between 0 and 255.” London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 160 (D. 
Mass. 2008) (citing America Online, Inc. v. Huang, 106 F. Supp. 2d 848, 851 (E.D. Va. 2000)). An 
example of an IP address is 128.122.168.24. What makes identifying individual defendants more 
difficult is the manner in which ISPs assign IP addresses to Internet users. Very few computers have 
a specific, unchanging IP address (known as a “static address”). Id. Most computers connect 
directly to a network controlled by their ISP that encompasses a designated range of possible IP 
addresses (for example, all numbers between 168.122.1.x to 168.122.100.x). Id. Each time an 
individual connects his or her computer to the Internet, the ISP assigns an IP address to that 
computer for the length of its connected session. Id. Each time the individual connects to the 
Internet, the IP address assigned may be different. “This process is known as ‘dynamic’ 
addressing.” Id. (citing H. Brian Holland, Tempest in a Teapot or Tidal Wave? Cybersquatting 
Rights & Remedies Run Amok, 10 J. TECH. L. &  POL’Y 301, 305 & nn.13–18 (2005)).  
 86. TCP stands for Transmission Control Protocol and is a high-level host-to-host connection 
protocol used in computer networks such as the Internet. TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL, 
DARPA INTERNET PROGRAM, PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION (RFC 793) 1 (1981), available at 
http://www.faqs.org/ftp/rfc/pdf/rfc793.txt.pdf.  
 87. Rampell, supra note 82. 
 88. Rampell, supra note 82. Thus, there is no actual distribution of the song. For a discussion 
on whether actual distribution is required for a cause of action under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), see infra 
Part V. However, in some instances, MediaSentry goes as far as downloading the songs from the 
targeted user. See, e.g., Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 978 (D. Ariz. 
2008). 
 89. Rampell, supra note 82. 
 90. Rampell, supra note 82. 
 91. Rampell, supra note 82. Furthermore, “peer-to-peer infringers use technology specifically 
configured not to retain direct evidence of wrongdoing, making proof of actual dissemination 
difficult.” Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224 (D. Minn. 2008). 
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actionable. Another shortfall in using MediaSentry for investigations 
involves a question of legal semantics—in the cases where MediaSentry 
actually downloads the files from the targeted user,92 is MediaSentry, as 
the authorized agent of the copyright holder, itself infringing any rights 
held by that copyright owner? 
An established principle of copyright law is that the lawful owner of a 
copyright cannot infringe its own copyright.93 Although not a lawful owner 
of the copyrighted songs it downloads from targeted P2P users, 
MediaSentry is an authorized investigator of the copyright owners; 
MediaSentry’ s “assignment [i]s part of [the copyright owner’ s] attempt to 
stop . . . infringement.”94 Such an assignment therefore “d[oes] not 
authorize the investigator to validate [the defendant’ s] unlawful 
conduct,”95 and distribution to MediaSentry may be sufficient to begin an 
infringement action against a P2P defendant.96 Although legal authority 
suggests MediaSentry’ s actions “can form the basis of an infringement 
claim,” it does not follow that all defendants witnessed by MediaSentry are 
necessarily liable for copyright infringement.97 Instead, the plaintiff must 
make an adequate showing beyond this available basis as required by case 
law and statute.98  
                                                                                                                     
 92. These cases are unique, however, as MediaSentry rarely completes the downloading of 
the copies of songs on the defendants’ hard drives. S e id. at 1215. 
 93. See, e.g., Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 23 F.3d 1345, 1348 (8th Cir. 1994); accord 
Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d 267, 271 (2d Cir. 1984) (“It is elementary that the lawful owner of a 
copyright is incapable of infringing a copyright interest that is owned by him . . . .”). 
 94. Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1348. 
 95. Id.; see also RCA/Ariola Int’l, Inc. v. Thomas & Grayston Co., 845 F.2d 773, 781–82 
(8th Cir. 1988) (holding defendant liable for active assistance in reproducing copyrighted works at 
the request of the authorized agent of the copyright holder); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 
554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (noting that “the recording companies obviously did not 
intend to license MediaSentry to authorize distribution or to reproduce copies of their works” and 
that MediaSentry’s assignment was part of an effort to stop the defendant’s infringement, such that 
the “12 copies obtained by MediaSentry [were] unauthorized”); Robert Kasunic, Making 
Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &  ENT. L.J. 
1145, 1157–60 (2008) (reviewing authority stating that an investigator may violate the copyright of 
its principal in an effort to stop the infringement of a third party). However, in cases like Olan Mills 
and RCA/Ariola, it was the defendant, and not the investigator, who made the copies at the behest of 
the investigator. Olan Mills, 23 F.3d at 1347; RCA/Ariola, 845 F.2d at 777. In a P2P transfer, the 
transferee actually initiates dissemination and makes the infringing copies without substantial 
participation by the transferor/defendant. Seeinfra note 214. Thus, Olan Mills and RCA/Ariola may 
be distinguishable on the facts. But see Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216 (noting that although 
“Thomas did not assist in the copying in the same manner as the retail defendant in Olan 
Mills . . . or as the retail defendants in RCA/Ariola . . . she allegedly did assist in a different, but 
substantial manner” by placing the copyrighted works in a folder specifically designated for 
dissemination to others). 
 96. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Adams, 2008 WL 4516309, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 3, 
2008) (“Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct [copyright] 
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IV.   A COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT PRIMER 
To establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement, the plaintiff 
must prove two elements: (1) “ownership of a valid copyright;” and (2) 
“copying” by the defendant.99 In P2P litigation, the first prong is almost 
never at issue, as the record companies have valid and registered 
copyrights for the allegedly infringed songs.100 The greater burden on the 
record companies lies in the second prong: proving whether the defendant 
“copied” the copyrighted works. This second prong, “copying,” is just a 
shorthand way of referencing an infringement of one of the five exclusive 
rights granted to copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106.101 Section 106 
grants to copyright holders a set of exclusive rights that encompasses 
reproduction of the copyrighted work,102 creation of derivative works based 
upon the copyrighted work,103 distribution of the copyrighted work,104 and 
public performance105 and display106 of the copyrighted work. In the 
context of P2P litigation, however, the distribution right of § 106(3) is the 
central issue. 
As noted previously in Part III.A, direct evidence of copyright 
infringement in P2P litigation is nearly impossible to obtain. Even when 
the RIAA employs MediaSentry to find potential infringers, rarely does the 
RIAA have direct evidence that the defendant actually disseminated the 
copyrighted material. In most cases, the RIAA’ s only evidence is that the 
defendant made the copyrighted material available for others to download 
freely on a P2P network. In an effort to overcome this technological 
burden, the RIAA attempts to prove infringement circumstantially (and 
without a showing of actual distribution) by putting forth a legal argument 
known as “making available.” 
                                                                                                                     
infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and (2) they must 
demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive right granted to copyright 
holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106.” (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1013 
(9th Cir. 2001))). 
 99. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). 
 100. See, e.g., Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 981 (“The recording companies’ ownership of valid 
copyrights to the sound recordings is not in dispute. Affidavits establish that they held valid, 
registered copyrights effective prior to the date on which the sound recordings were found.”); Arista 
Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., 2002 WL 1997918, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (“The record 
companies’ ownership of the sound recordings at issue has not been disputed.”). 
 101. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Paramount Pictures v. Video Broad. Sys., 724 F. Supp. 808, 819 (D. Kan. 1989)). See also 17 
U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as 
provided by section[] 106 . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . of the author.”). 
 102. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). 
 103. Id. § 106(2). 
 104. Id. § 106(3). 
 105. Id. §§ 106(4), (6). 
 106. Id. § 106(5). 
15
Galluzzo: When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails its Purpose: How P2P Li
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
1180 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
V.  A SIMPLE SHOWING OF ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION 
A.  Making Available 
Title 17 of U.S.C. § 106(3) grants copyright holders the exclusive 
ability “to do and to authorize . . . [the distribution of] copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public.”107 A plain reading of 
the statute appears to grant two distinct rights—“doing” and “authorizing” a 
distribution.108 Because it is nearly impossible for the RIAA to catch an 
infringer “doing” an unauthorized distribution,109 the only actionable 
“authorization” of distribution may be when an individual merely makes 
copyrighted material available over the Internet.110 This is what is known 
as the “making available” argument.111 Generally, the “making available” 
argument states that when a defendant lists copyrighted works on an index, 
also known as a “shared folder,” and that index is uploaded to a P2P file-
sharing network available to other individuals, that defendant has violated 
the exclusive right of distribution in § 106(3) of the Copyright Act.112 
Because a plain reading of § 106 literally grants the exclusive right to 
“authorize,” it seems to follow that an individual who, without permission 
                                                                                                                     
 107. Id. § 106(3). 
 108. See London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 109. An exception may be a distribution to its agent, MediaSentry. See supra Part III.B. 
However, the legal ramifications of this kind of download are unclear. See id. Even without direct 
evidence of an unauthorized distribution, however, plaintiffs can use circumstantial evidence in an 
attempt to prove actual dissemination of copyrighted material. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 
F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008). 
 110. Normally, liability under § 106 is conditioned upon allowance under the fair use doctrine. 
Fair use is governed by 17 U.S.C. § 107 and generally is an exception to the exclusive rights 
granted to copyright holders in §106. 4 PATRY, supra note 17, § 13:13 (Sept. 2008). The principle 
of fair use allows individuals to use copyrighted work without the copyright owner’s permission 
“for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). Each instance of a claimed fair 
use must be determined on a case-by-case basis and with consideration of the four nonexclusive 
factors listed in § 107. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985). 
However, there is no case on point that determines whether fair use applies to the distribution right 
alone. At least one commentator believes fair use does not apply to the distribution right. See 
Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1038–39 (stating generally that copying is not infringement as it is 
protected by fair use, but distribution is infringement). Whereas a downloader makes a single copy 
of a copyrighted work for personal use, the distributor “opens his disk for the entire world to copy, 
if they wish. The former is fair use; the latter is not.” Id  at 1039; see also BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 
2005 WL 106592, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2005) (stating that fair use doesn’t apply in the context of 
“sampling”). But see 4 PATRY, supra note 17, § 13:13 (recognizing that although no reported 
opinion has commented on the fair use defense when only the distribution right is claimed, fair use 
is still an exception to all of the exclusive rights granted in § 106). 
 111. Kristy Wiehe, Dollars, Downloads, and Digital Distribution: Is “Making Available” a 
Copyrighted Work a Violation of the Author’s Distribution Right?, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 117, 118 
(2008). 
 112. Id. 
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of the copyright holder, “makes available” a copyrighted work authorizes 
an infringing distribution within the meaning of § 106. In 1997, the Fourth 
Circuit, in what would later become a surprisingly important decision, 
issued Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, the first 
case to address this issue.113 
In Hotaling, the plaintiffs had compiled and copyrighted a collection of 
genealogical research materials.114 Some time later, the defendant, the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, acquired a legitimate copy of 
the materials and added it to the Church’ s collection at its main library.115 
At some point, the Church made copies of the materials without the 
permission of the plaintiffs and sent the copies to several of its branch 
libraries.116 The plaintiffs learned of these unauthorized copies and filed 
suit,117 arguing that the Church had violated their distribution right under 
17 U.S.C. § 106(3).118 The Fourth Circuit noted that distributing unlawful 
copies of a copyrighted work to the public is an infringement.119 Therefore, 
the case turned on whether the Church distributed the materials.120 
Although the Church held the unauthorized copies in a collection that was 
open to the public, the Church kept no records of who accessed the 
collection.121 Thus, there was no evidence of specific instances when the 
Church loaned unauthorized copies to members of the public.122 The 
Church argued that this holding in an open collection was at most an offer 
to distribute the work and that to establish distribution, a member of the 
public needs to have accepted that offer.123 The Fourth Circuit disagreed.124 
In a famous statement reiterated in many briefs by the RIAA and 
amici,125 the court stated, “[w]hen a public library adds a work to its 
                                                                                                                     
 113. Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997). 
Hotaling is the basis of the RIAA’s “making available” argument, and is one of the strongest cases 
for the plaintiffs in P2P litigations today. 
 114. Id. at 201. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 202. 
 118. Id. at 203. 
 119. Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2006) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner as provided by section[] 106 . . . is an infringer of the copyright or right of the 
author, as the case may be.”).  
 120. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. E.g., Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in Support of Defendant John Doe’s Motion to Quash Subpoena at 7, London-Sire 
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04-cv-12434-NG), 
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=arista_does1-21_080219RIAABriefOpposEFF; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae MPAA in Connection with Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
at 9, Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05CV7340), 
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collection, lists the work in its index or catalog system, and makes the work 
available to the borrowing or browsing public, it has completed all the 
steps necessary for distribution to the public.”126 The court noted that if 
this kind of distribution were not actionable within the meaning of 17 
U.S.C. § 106(3), “a copyright holder would be prejudiced by a library that 
does not keep records of public use, and the library would unjustly profit 
by its own omission.”127 The court continued, “no one can expect a 
copyright holder to prove particular instances of use by the public when the 
proof is impossible to produce because the infringing library has not kept 
records of public use.”128 Equitable concerns indeed influenced the 
Hotaling court. 
Four years later, in A&M v. Napster, the Ninth Circuit followed suit.129 
In Napster II, the Ninth Circuit was concerned mainly with the secondary 
liability of Napster for the copyright infringement of its individual users.130 
Napster did not provide any of the infringing content but rather supplied its 
subscribers with a directory service and facilitated connections between 
users who had found each other by means of that directory.131 While 
considering whether or not the individual users had infringed the 
copyrights of the plaintiffs, however, the court stated that “Napster users 
who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate 
plaintiffs’  distribution rights” under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).132 Although the 
Napster II court never mentioned the Hotaling decision, the RIAA and 
amici contend that the court advanced a similar reasoning.133 
The language the Napster II court used may only serve as dicta, 
however, because it adjudicates a procedurally separate issue. In Napster 
II , the defendant-appellant did not contest that its users were directly 
infringing the copyrights of the plaintiff-appellees and the appeal was taken 
on different grounds.134 Conversely, in the vast majority of P2P cases 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=elektra_barker_mpaabrief. 
 126. Hotaling, 118 F.3d at 203 (emphasis added). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 204. See also Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board, Inc. 2002 WL 1997918, at * 4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002) (applying this principle from Hotaling in the context of digital 
distributions of sound recordings over the Internet). 
 129. Napster II, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 130. Id. at 1011. 
 131.  Id. 
 132. Id. at 1014. 
 133. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant John Doe’s Motion to Quash Subpoena at 7-8, 
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04-cv-12434-NG), 
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=arista_does1-21_080219RIAABriefOpposEFF; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae MPAA in Connection with Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Complaint 
at 9–10, 17–18, Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 
05CV7340), http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=elektra_barker_mpaabrief. 
 134. Napster II, 239 F.3d at 1013 (“We note that the district court’s conclusion that plaintiffs 
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involving individual defendants, the defendants challenge the RIAA’ s 
assertion that they were directly infringing the copyrights of the 
plaintiffs.135 Furthermore, in the fallout of the original Napster II litigation, 
the Northern District of California thoroughly disapproved of the “making 
available” argument as it pertained to the Napster II  litigation and other 
similar P2P litigation.136 That court refused to accept the “making 
available” argument to prove violation of the distribution right of 
§ 106(3)137 and required a higher burden of proof—a showing of direct 
infringement.138 Other courts have similarly required plaintiffs to show 
actual distribution by the defendant to prove infringement. 
The Ninth Circuit recently considered one such case, Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc.139 In Perfect 10, the plaintiff argued that the defendants 
infringed the plaintiff’ s distribution right to its pornographic images by 
maintaining an index of smaller, lesser quality images and displaying them 
on public web pages.140 Using the simple Google Image Search function, 
anyone could access the web pages containing “thumbnail” versions of the 
copyrighted pornographic images.141 The Ninth Circuit stated that a 
                                                                                                                     
have presented a prima facie case of direct infringement by Napster users is not presently appealed 
by Napster. We only need briefly address the threshold requirements.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Defendant David Greubel’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, Arista 
Records, LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (No. 4-05CV-531-Y), 
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=arista_greubel_motdismiss; Memorandum of 
Law of Defendant Anna Goldshteyn in Support of Her Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 4, 
Maverick Recording Co. v. Goldshteyn, No. 05-CV-4523, 2006 WL 2166870 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 
2006), http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=maverick_goldshteyn_memooflaw. But 
see BMG Music v. Gonzalez, No. 03-C-6276, 2005 WL 106592, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 2005) 
(noting that the defendant admitted infringement by downloading thirty songs from the Internet, but 
challenged summary judgment based upon applicability of the fair use defense). 
 136. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2005) 
(“[T]o the extent that Hotaling suggests that a mere offer to distribute a copyrighted work gives rise 
to liability under section 106(3), that view is contrary to the weight of [other] authorities.”). 
 137. Id. at 802–03. 
 138. The court stated: 
Rather than requiring proof of the actual dissemination of a copyrighted work 
or an offer to distribute that work for the purpose of its further distribution or 
public performance, plaintiffs’ theory is premised on the assumption that any 
offer to distribute a copyrighted work violates section 106(3). This is not 
sufficient to satisfy plaintiffs’ burden of proving that Napster or its users 
directly infringed their copyrighted musical compositions and sound 
recordings, as they must do if they are to hold defendants secondarily liable for 
that infringement. 
Id. at 805; see also Nat’l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 430 
(8th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing the requirement of actual distribution and rejecting that “an allegation 
that National ‘permitted the use’ necessarily amount[ed] to an allegation of the actual distribution of 
a copy”). 
 139. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 140. Id. at 1155–57. 
 141. Id. at 1157. 
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violation of the distribution right under the Copyright Act requires actual 
dissemination of the copyrighted work.142 The court distinguished Perfect 
10 from Hotaling in an effort to avoid assigning liability under “making 
available,”143 stating that Hotaling did not apply because “Google [did] not 
own a collection of Perfect 10’ s full-size images” and did not “make [the 
images] available to the public.”144 The Ninth Circuit therefore rejected the 
“making available” argument when the alleged infringer “does not have a 
collection of stored full-size images it makes available to the public.”145 
Unfortunately, Perfect 10 left unclear whether an infringing distribution 
exists when the defendant does maintain full-size copies of the copyrighted 
work and makes those full-size copies available to the public. 
On this issue, London-Sire v. Doe 1 picks up where Perfect 10 left 
off.146 London-Sire was cookie-cutter P2P litigation in which the record 
companies consolidated four separate lawsuits into a single court 
proceeding.147 In considering whether § 106(3) requires an actual 
dissemination, the court noted, “defendants’  actions must do more than 
‘ authorize’  a distribution; they must actually ‘ do’  it.”148 The court further 
stated, “[m]erely because the defendant has completed all the steps 
necessary for distribution does not necessarily mean that a distribution has 
actually occurred. It is a distribution that the statute plainly requires.”149 
The London-Sire court thoroughly rejected the “making available” 
argument as it was contrary to the statutory requirements of an infringing 
distribution.150 By similarly requiring actual distribution and rejecting the 
sufficiency of a mere “authorization,” other courts have looked to the 
legislative history of § 106(3).  
In Venegas-Hernandez v. Asociacion De Compositores y Editores De 
Musica Latinoamericana, the First Circuit considered a convoluted appeal 
by the surviving children of a well-known Puerto Rican composer.151 The 
composer’ s children contested the ownership rights of works their father 
had licensed during his lifetime and sued the defendants for copyright 
                                                                                                                     
 142. See id. at 1162.  
 143. The Perfect 10 Court referred to it as “deemed distribution.” See id.  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 147. Id. at 157. Courts often consolidate P2P lawsuits because “[t]he cases involve similar, 
even virtually identical, issues of law and fact: the alleged use of peer-to-peer software to share 
copyrighted sound recordings.” Id. at 161. 
 148. Id. at 166. But see Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 
2006) (“[T]he courts have recognized that making copyrighted works available to others may 
constitute infringement by distribution in certain circumstances.”). 
 149. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 168 (footnotes, citations, and internal quotations 
omitted). 
 150. Id. at 166–68. 
 151. Venegas-Hernandez v. Asociacion De Compositores y Editores De Musica 
Latinoamericana, 424 F.3d 50, 51–53 (1st Cir. 2005). 
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infringement152 Without any evidence that the songs were copied or 
performed under the unauthorized licenses granted by the defendants, the 
plaintiffs alleged violation of the distribution right solely by way of the 
licenses themselves.153 In rejecting the plaintiffs’  argument,154 the court 
noted that the “authorize” language was added to § 106 by the Copyright 
Act of 1976 to “avoid any questions as to the liability of contributory 
infringers.”155 Following this legislative intent, the court opined that the 
drafters of the “authorize” language “did not intend to create an 
independent liability for authorizing where no [evidenced] infringing 
act . . . thereafter occurred.”156 Because there was “no direct proof of an 
infringing act” after the defendants granted the unauthorized licenses, the 
defendants were not liable for infringement.157  
In light of this authority, there is no actionable offense under § 106(3) 
when a person does not actually consummate a distribution. The 
“authorize” language of the statute only guarantees liability for 
contributory and vicarious infringers and serves no purpose in individual 
infringement cases. Thus, the “making available” argument, as applied in 
the context of P2P litigation and digital distributions, confuses the 
language of § 106 and fails to serve as an appropriate basis for a cause of 
infringement. Hotaling should therefore be narrowly construed to apply 
only to its facts, i.e., only where such a grossly inequitable action by the 
defendant obfuscates any evidence of actual distribution. In most P2P 
cases, there exists no such inequitable conduct. Consequently, some 
authorities argue instead that a defendant violates the distribution right by 
another act not explicitly precluded in § 106(3)—publication. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 152. Id. The plaintiff children alleged that the defendants violated the distribution right by way 
of granting unauthorized licenses to the copyrighted material. Id. at 57. 
 153. Id. at 59 (“The [plaintiffs’] position is that the mere fact of licensing creates a 
presumption that the works were the subject of infringing acts . . . .”).  
 154.  “[Plaintiffs’ argument] ignores the reality that licensees often seek broad licenses 
covering a range of works, allowing them to choose what to use.  Depending upon the surrounding 
circumstances, an inference that a work was performed [or copied] might be stronger or weaker, but 
a universal presumption is not justified.” Id.
 155. Id. at 58 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976) [hereinafter 
HOUSE REPORT], reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674). 
 156. Venegas-Hernandez, 424 F.3d at 58; see also Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. 
Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[T]here is no violation of the right to [distribute] copyrighted 
works . . . where the defendant offers to sell copyrighted materials but does not consummate a sale; 
equally, there is no infringement of the [distribution] right where there is copying, but no sale of the 
material copied.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 157. Venegas-Hernandez, 424 F.3d at 59; see also SBK Catalogue P’ship v. Orion Pictures 
Corp., 723 F. Supp. 1053, 1064 (D.N.J. 1989) (“[T]he mere act of ‘authorizing,’ without proof that 
the party so authorized actually distributed copies of the copyrighted work, does not constitute 
copyright infringement under the Act . . . .”).  
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B.  The Relationship of Distribution and Publication 
Although § 106(3) grants to copyright holders the exclusive right of 
distribution, the Copyright Act fails to define a “distribution” anywhere in 
its text. To overcome this supposed omission, P2P plaintiffs contend that 
“distribution” and “publication,” a more well-defined right,158 are 
synonymous.159 Similar to the “making available” argument, equating 
“publication” and “distribution” avoids the requirement of actual 
distribution because “publication” encompasses the right to “offer[] to 
distribute copies” of the copyrighted work.160 
This argument is not without merit. Looking to the plain language of 
§ 101, publication is defined as  
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to 
the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by 
rental, lease, or lending. The offering to distribute copies or 
phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further 
distribution, public performance, or public display, 
constitutes publication. A public performance or display of 
a work does not of itself constitute publication.161 
By this definition, “distribution” and “publication” are more than 
similar. In fact, the first sentence of the definition of “publication” is 
nearly identical to the distribution right of § 106(3).162 Additionally, 
several courts163 including the Supreme Court,164 have supported the 
proposition that a distribution is synonymous with publication of a 
copyrighted work. 
In Arista Records LLC v. Greubel,165 the Northern District of Texas 
considered an action for copyright infringement of 1087 copyrighted 
computer files found on defendant Greubel’ s computer that Greubel made 
                                                                                                                     
 158. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “publication”). 
 159. See, e.g., Elektra Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240–41 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008); Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation in Support of Defendant John Doe’s Motion to Quash Subpoena at 12-13, London-Sire, 
542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008) (No. 04-CV-12434-NG), http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILR 
PDF.asp?filename=arista_does1-21_080219RIAABriefOpposEFF. 
 160. 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Compare id. with 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
 163. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prod., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 164. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985). But see 
London-Sire Records, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 168 ( quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 (criticizing 
the RIAA’s position that the Harper & Row Court held that publication and distribution were 
congruent, and instead stating that the Harper & Row Court merely stated that “§ 106(3) 
‘recognized for the first time a distinct statutory right of first publication,’ and quoted the legislative 
history as establishing that § 106(3) gives a copyright holder ‘the right to control the first public 
distribution of an authorized copy . . . of his work.’”)). 
 165.  453 F. Supp. 2d. 961 (N.D. Tex. 2006). 
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available to the public via a P2P program.166 In considering whether 
“making available” was sufficient to violate the distribution right, the court 
equated “distribution” with “publication” such that an offer to distribute 
met the requirements of § 106(3).167 The court noted that “not just any 
offer will suffice”—instead, the offer must be such that “further 
distribution, public performance, or public display is contemplated.”168 
The Western District of Texas similarly required such an offer in 
Warner Bros. Records v. Payne169 but applied the principle directly to P2P 
software.170 The court stated, “offering to distribute a music file by listing 
it on an online file-sharing system contemplates ‘ further distribution.’  
Making an unauthorized copy of a sound recording available to countless 
users of a peer-to-peer system for free certainly contemplates and 
encourages further distribution, both on the Internet and elsewhere.”171 
Furthermore, the legislative history appears to support the notion that 
“distribution” and “publication” are synonymous. While debating the 
Copyright Act of 1976, the House Judiciary Committee openly described 
the right granted under § 106(3) as the “right of publications.”172 
Throughout the discussion, the committees used the terms “publication” 
and “distribution” interchangeably.173 This legislative use supports the 
contention that distribution is not defined in the Copyright Act because the 
common understanding at the time of the Act’ s passage was that 
“distribution to the public [was] . . . essentially synonymous with 
‘ publication,’  which means distribution of tangible copies. ”174
The foregoing authorities, however, make two critical errors in equating 
“publication” with “distribution.” First, publication is quite different from 
 distribution in that publication implicitly “cannot occur without the 
copyright owner’ s consent.”175 Thus, any unauthorized digital 
transmission of a work “would violate the copyright owner’ s § 106(3) 
right of distribution, but would not result in publication,” due to the lack of 
consent.176 Second, the authority that finds publication and distribution 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Id. at 963.  
 167. Id. at 969. 
 168. Id. n.11 (citations omitted). 
 169. No. W-06-CA-051, 2006 WL 2844415 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 
 170. Id. at *1. 
 171. Id. at *4. See also Interscope Records v. Duty, 2006 WL 988086, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2006) 
(“[T]he mere presence of copyrighted sound recordings in Duty’s share file may constitute 
copyright infringement.”). 
 172. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 62. The committees also recited the exclusive rights 
granted to copyright holders as “the exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation, publication, 
performance, and display.” Id. at 61 (emphasis added). 
 173. See id. at 61–62. 
 174. Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1011. 
 175. RayMing Chang, “Publication” Does Not Really Mean Publication: The Need to Amend 
the Definition of Publication in the Copyright Act, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 225, 232 (2005). 
 176. Id. 
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synonymous looks only to the first sentence of the definition of 
“publication” and disregards the remainder.177 The language distinguishing 
publication from distribution is contained in the second sentence of the 
definition of publication and is entirely absent from § 106(3);178 the 
language addresses an “offer” to publish.179 Publication, then, is a much 
broader180 right than that of the plain language of the distribution right.181 
A publication can occur by “distribution of copies or phonorecords of a 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease 
or lending.”182 Unlike distribution, publication can also occur by “offering 
to distribute copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of 
further distribution, public performance, or public display.” 183 Thus, § 101 
clearly allows for infringement liability based solely upon an offer to 
publish while § 106(3) does not. Publication and distribution are related 
concepts but do not encompass the same activities. 
Although a plain reading of the Copyright Act reveals that all 
distributions to the public are publications, it does not necessarily follow 
that all publications are distributions.184 Equating these two concepts is a 
logical fallacy known as “affirming the consequent.”185 As an example, an 
author may sell a copy of her unpublished novel to a member of a 
public.186 This action constitutes both distribution and publication.187 
However, if the author merely offers to sell the novel to a member of the 
public, without actually consummating that sale, neither a distribution nor 
a publication has occurred.188 And if the author makes an offer of sale to a 
publishing house with the intent of future distributions but does not 
actually consummate that sale, a publication, and not a distribution, has 
occurred.189 By this illustration, then, it is more proper to recognize that 
                                                                                                                     
 177. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 
1991) (equating “distribution” with “publication” by only looking to the first sentence of the 
definition of “publication”). 
 178. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106(3).  
 179. See id. § 101. 
 180. And, at the same time, narrower because it does not require the copyright owner’s 
consent. See Chang, supra note 175, at 232–33. 
 181. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 101, with 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). 
 182. Id. § 101. 
 183. Id. (emphasis added). 
 184. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d. 153, 169 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 185. Affirming the consequent occurs by the following: If P, then Q; Q, therefore P. 4 PATRY, 
supra note 17, § 13:11.50. In the context of publications and distributions then, the fallacy occurs 
by the following: all distributions are publications; therefore if there is a distribution, there has also 
been a publication. See id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
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distributions are but a subset of publications.190 Therefore, it is improper to 
allow an “offer” to distribute to satisfy the distribution right of § 106(3) 
because distribution and publication are not synonymous. 
C.  Distinctions in Other Sections of the Act 
After discarding the “authorize” language for purposes of individual 
infringement and recognizing that “distribution” is a more narrow right 
than “publication,” it is difficult to stretch the plain language of the statute 
to require anything but an actual infringement.191 If Congress intended an 
offer to distribute to violate a copyright holder’ s distribution right, it could 
have specified an offer to distribute in the list of prohibited actions: “sale 
or other transfer of ownership . . . rental, lease, [and] lending.”192 
Certainly, Congress knows how to distinguish acts from offers to act 
because other sections of the Copyright Act make that distinction.193 
Congress has made similar distinctions in other areas of law, such as the 
Patent Act.194 If Congress intended to grant copyright holders the right of 
an offer to distribute the copyrighted work, Congress could easily have 
specified such in the Copyright Act. 
A survey of legal authority thus affirms that there cannot be a violation 
of the distribution right of § 106(3) where the alleged infringer offers to 
distribute the works without an actual distribution or copies the works 
without an actual distribution.195 But even with this matter disposed, there 
remain other unanswered questions with respect to whether electronic files 
and digital distributions fit within the defined limits of the distribution 
right. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 190. See Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 985 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“It is 
untenable that the definition of a different word in a different section of the statute was meant to 
expand the meaning of ‘distribution’ and liability under § 106(3) to include offers to distribute.”). 
 191. But see, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223–24 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting 
that in the context of criminal penalties for distribution of child pornography, that placing child 
pornography in Kazaa’s shared folder and making the material freely available and downloadable 
for other users was sufficient for a distribution within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)). 
 192. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
 193. The section that discusses protections to copyrights on semiconductor chip products 
defines “to distribute” as: “to sell, lease, bail, or otherwise transfer, o  to offer to sell, lease, bail, or 
otherwise transfer . . . .” Id. § 901(a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added); see also id. § 506(a)(1)(C) 
(holding criminally liable those who distribute “a work being prepared for commercial distribution, 
by making it available on a computer network accessible to members of the public”) (emphasis 
added).  
 194. “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) 
(emphasis added).  
 195. See Obolensky v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(footnotes omitted).  
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VI.   DISTRIBUTION’ S BIAS TOWARD TANGIBILITY  
A.  The Materiality of Electronic Files 
Looking again to the plain language of the distribution right, § 106(3) 
does not grant an exclusive right to distributions of all forms of a 
copyrighted work. Instead, it grants a more narrow right to distribute 
“copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work.”196 Notwithstanding the 
problems discussed thus far, the uncertainty of whether an electronic file 
can be distributed within the meaning of § 106(3) presents quite a 
quandary for lawyers and judges alike. For purposes of the distribution 
right, does a computer file, representing a series of 1’ s and 0’ s,197 satisfy 
the definition of a “copy”?198  
The Copyright Act defines both phonorecords and copies as “material 
objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device.”199 The Copyright Act further states that a work is “fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or 
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently 
permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”200 Other 
sources, such as the House Report addressing the Copyright Act of 1976, 
also emphasize the definition of a “copy” as a physical object.201 At least 
                                                                                                                     
 196. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006). 
 197. Computer files, at their lowest software abstraction, are represented by a string of binary 
code, which encompasses two numbers: 1 and 0. See Encyclopedia Britannica, 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/681536/binary-code (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 198. As a principal of strict statutory language under the Copyright Act, material objects 
representing a sound recording is referred to as a “phonorecord” while a “copy” is a material object 
representing all other forms of copyrightable expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. For simplicity’s sake, 
this Note uses the term “copy” to encompass both forms of reproduction. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. But see R. Anthony Reese, The Public Display Right: The Copyright Act’s Neglected 
Solution to the Controversy Over RAM “Copies,”  2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 83, 128 n.171 (exploring 
whether the definition of “fixed” in § 101 should also suffice as a definition of “fixed” for purposes 
of whether something is a copy or phonorecord). 
 201. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 52–53 (discussing the requirement that work be 
“fixed in a ‘tangible medium of expression’”). The House Report emphasizes that a copy is a 
physical, tangible object that acts as the medium of expression for the underlying artistic work: 
The definition of [‘copies’] in section 101 . . . reflect[s] a fundamental 
distinction between the ‘original work’ which is the product of ‘authorship’ 
and the multitude of material objects in which it can be embodied. Thus, in the 
sense of the bill, a ‘book’ is not a work of authorship, but is a particular kind of 
‘copy.’ Instead, the author may write a ‘literary work,’ which in turn can be 
embodied in a wide range of ‘copies’ . . . including books, periodicals, 
computer punch cards, microfilm, tape recordings, and so forth. 
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one commentator agrees.202 
Similarly, many decisions, such as that in Agee v. Paramount 
Communications, Inc.203 have followed the plain language of the statute 
and legislative history in requiring transmission of a material object.204 In 
Agee, the plaintiff owned two copyrights in sound recordings used by 
Paramount in its Hard Copy television program, aired by satellite 
transmission to television stations around the country.205 The plaintiff sued 
Paramount for copyright infringement and the  television stations for, 
among other things, unauthorized copying and distribution of that copy to 
the public.206 In considering the violation of distribution right allegation, 
the court noted, “merely transmitting a sound recording to the public on the 
airwaves does not constitute a ‘ distribution.’ ”207 Instead, distribution 
“require[s] transmission of a ‘ material object’  in which the sound 
recording is fixed: a work that is of ‘ more than transitory duration.’ ”208 
Computer files, however, are distinguishable from immaterial satellite 
communications. Following the plain language of the statute and the 
reasoning from the legislative history, commentators, and case law, a 
computer file is unequivocally a “material object” within the meaning of 
the Copyright Act.209 The work is “fixed” in a material object (the hard 
drive or other memory storage device), is sufficiently permanent,210 and 
may be perceived or reproduced with the aid of a computer utilizing the 
appropriate hardware or software.211 It does not matter that one cannot 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 53. 
 202. See Reese, supra note 200, at 126 (noting that a copy is “a book, a newspaper, a 
magazine, a CD-ROM, a computer diskette, a set of computer punch cards” and other tangible 
embodiments, thus restricting the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute such tangible 
embodiments). 
 203. 59 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 204. Id. at 325–26. 
 205. Id. at 319. 
 206. Id. at 320. 
 207. Id. at 325. 
 208. Id. (citations omitted). Agee is still helpful case law even though satellite transmissions 
are distinguishable from digital transmissions. At the receiving end of a digital transmission, the 
transferee retains a copy of the disseminated work, whereas at the receiving end of a satellite 
television transmission, the transferee can only watch and listen to the program playing on his or 
her television, without the ability to physically possess that program. 
 209. However, as stated in the House Report, the requirement of “fixation” excludes “purely 
evanescent or transient reproductions such as those . . . captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a 
computer.” HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 53. For purposes of a saved file on a hard drive, 
however, the file is not captured “momentarily,” but for a significant duration. See infra notes 210–
211 and accompanying text. 
 210. Hard drives have an average life span of 3–5 years. Ultimate Hard Drives, Hard Drive 
Life Span, http://www.ultimate-hard-drives.com/hard-drive-life-span/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). 
 211. Case law supports the proposition that a file stored in memory on a computer is a “copy” 
for purposes of the Copyright Act. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“A photographic image is a work that is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, for 
purposes of the Copyright Act, when embodied (i.e. stored) in a computer’s server (or hard disk, or 
27
Galluzzo: When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails its Purpose: How P2P Li
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
1192 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
physically hold a single computer file or copy it in the way one would copy 
a book or an audiocassette.212 However, for an infringement of the 
distribution right, a computer file fitting the definition of a “material 
object” alone is not enough—an electronic transmission of such a file must 
qualify as a distribution within the meaning of § 106(3). 
B.  Digital Transmission Dilemmas 
The second part of § 106(3) requires the distribution be by 
“sale . . . rental, lease, or lending,” or involve a “transfer of ownership” or 
other possessory right in a material object.213 In the context of P2P 
litigation, there is authority that questions whether a digital transfer,214 by 
means of a computer network or the Internet, is a distribution within the 
meaning of § 106(3).215 During a digital transfer, the original computer file 
                                                                                                                     
other storage device). The image stored in the computer is the copy of the work for the purposes of 
copyright law.”) (internal quotations omitted); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 
511, 517–18 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “loading of copyrighted software into [computer 
memory] creates a ‘copy’ of that software”); see also London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. 
Supp. 2d. 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (reviewing the method by which files are transferred on a P2P 
network and stating that “[t]he electronic file . . . is therefore a ‘phonorecord’ within the meaning of 
the statute”) (citation omitted). 
 212. The House Report gave a very broad allowance for what constitutes a medium of fixation: 
[I]t makes no difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may 
be—whether it is in words, numbers, notes, sounds, pictures, or any other 
graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a physical object in written, 
printed, photographic, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or any other stable form, 
and whether it is capable of perception directly or by means of any machine or 
device ‘now known or later developed.’ 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 52. 
 213. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006); see also Reese, supra note 200, at 126–27. 
 214. To understand how files are transferred over the Internet, an illustration may be helpful. 
E, the transferee, wants a nondescript computer file, C1, from the transferor, T. C1 is stored on the 
hard drive or other storage device of T’s computer. After a request for the file from E, and just prior 
to a transfer by T, T’s computer reads the binary code that represents C1 on the hard drive, and 
divides that information into many sequential packets of data. No single packet encompasses 
enough data to represent the entire C1 file, and a computer cannot reconstruct a file from the series 
of packets if any single packet is missing. T’s computer then sends each packet of data sequentially 
to E’s computer, which collects the packets, arranges them into binary code, and then saves that 
code in its entirety to the hard drive on E’s computer. E now has an entirely new and identical copy 
of C1 saved on his hard drive, represented as C2. The data packets transferred only exist during the 
short duration of transfer and effectively disappear after E’s computer constructs the resulting file, 
C2, from them.  
 215. See, e.g., 4 PATRY, supra note 17, at §§ 13:11, 13:11.50 (stating that there is no 
distribution when the transferee “takes” a file from a transferor’s hard drive, and that it is legally 
and technically incorrect to conclude that the transferor distributed the work); ROGER E. SCHECHTER 
&  JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS 
81 (2003) (“It is clear . . . that under the statutory language now in effect there has been no 
distribution of copies or phonorecords . . . to the public and hence no publication when a work is 
disseminated electronically”). 
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remains on the transferor’ s hard drive.216 When the transferee requests the 
file from the transferor’ s computer and then receives that file, there is no 
physical transfer of ownership or possessory interest in that computer file. 
Only the information contained in the original file is transferred, and 
nothing more. Thus the argument goes, although the underlying 
copyrighted work is transferred by means of many bite-sized packets of 
information,217 a “phonorecord” or “copy” of the copyrighted work is not. 
Some commentators suggest that this mere transfer of information fails to 
divest the transferor of his or her original copy and does not implicate any 
ownership rights through the transfer of that copy; therefore, a digital 
transfer does not fit within the boundaries of the distribution right.218 A 
line of cases, however, contrarily suggests that Internet transmission does 
implicate the distribution right as a transfer of material objects. 
The most significant case following this line of reasoning is Playboy v. 
Frena.219 In Frena, the plaintiff operated a subscription computer bulletin 
board service (BBS).220 Each subscriber to the BBS had the ability to 
upload files onto the bulletin board so that the uploaded files would be 
stored into memory on the BBS computer.221 Once a subscriber uploaded 
files to the bulletin board, all subscribers could browse through the BBS 
directories to look at and download the posted files onto their home 
computers.222 The BBS contained 170 images copyrighted by Playboy, and 
Playboy sued for infringement.223 The court recognized that “Section 
106(3) grants the copyright owner ‘ the exclusive right to sell, give away, 
rent or lend any material embodiment of his work.’ ”224 Notwithstanding 
the lack of a transfer of possessory interest and the intangible nature of the 
                                                                                                                     
 216. See supra note 214. 
 217. Id. 
 218. WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 92, 213; Fred H. Cate, The Technological Transformation 
of Copyright Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1422 (1996) (“In the digital context . . . there is really no 
such thing as a distribution. Virtually all transfers of digital files result in a new copy being created, 
rather than the original copy being transferred.”); Reese, supra note 200, at 127–28. Professor 
Reese further notes that the infringing activity does not take place during the transmission, but later, 
at the point in which the transferee takes the transferred information and makes a new copy of the 
original file. Id. at 129 (“This activity is basically the same as photocopying a printed volume: the 
user takes an existing copy of a work and mechanically fixes the work in a new material object, thus 
creating a new copy. This, of course, is a quintessential act of [an infringing] reproduction.”). 
 219. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D. Fla. 1993). 
 220. Id. at 1554. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. Playboy sued Frena because, using similar reasoning to that used in Napster II and its 
progeny, Frena “supplied a product containing unauthorized copies of a copyrighted work.” Id. at 
1556. It did not matter that Frena did not make the copies himself. Id. (citing JAY DRATLER, JR., 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 6.01[3], at 6–
15 (1991)). 
 224. Id. (emphasis added). 
29
Galluzzo: When "Now Known or Later Developed" Fails its Purpose: How P2P Li
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
1194 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
 
transfer, the court found that the distribution right “ha[d] been implicated 
by . . . Frena.”225 
Despite contrary decisions by the district courts, and even the Supreme 
Court,226 others argue that Congress deliberately chose to define the 
distribution right such that it purposefully excludes situations such as this, 
when copyrighted work is transferred via a stream of digital information, 
and not as a “phonorecord” or “copy” of the work.227 It follows that if 
Congress had intended for the distribution right to encompass the entire 
copyrighted work, and not just material objects embodying reproductions 
of the work, Congress could have specified such, as it did in other sections 
of the Act.228 Furthermore, in other sections of the Copyright Act, 
Congress specifically limited the term “distribution” to apply only to the 
physical transfer of copyrighted work.229 Normally, there is a “strong 
presumption that the plain language of the statute expresses congressional 
intent [that] is rebutted only in rare and exceptional circumstances.”230 The 
distribution right of §106(3), however, may qualify as a rare and 
exceptional circumstance. 
At the drafting of the Copyright Act of 1976 and specifically the 
exclusive rights under § 106, it did not make sense to distribute an 
immaterial object or reproduction of the copyrighted work. A reproduction 
was a physical transfer of a manuscript, a photograph, or a cassette tape. 
                                                                                                                     
 225. Playboy Enters. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (M.D. Fla. 1993). See also Playboy 
Enters. v. Webbworld, Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 550–53 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (expanding the rule of 
Frena and holding that transmissions over the Internet, and not just over a bulletin board system, 
implicate the distribution right); Playboy Enters. v. Russ Hardenburgh, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 503, 512–
15 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (following the holding of Frena); Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publ’g, 
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (following the holding of Frena). Professor Reese 
criticizes Frena and its progeny as misinterpreting the distribution right. Reese, supranote 200, at 
125–36. In Professor Reese’s view, “[t]he distribution right as currently framed . . . does not appear 
to encompass transmissions of copyrighted works over computer networks.” Id. at 125–26. 
“Interpreting the distribution right to encompass computer network transmissions not only conflicts 
with the plain language of the right but also with its legislative history.” Id. at 127. 
 226. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 498 (2001) (indicating that in the context of the 
Internet, sale and digital distribution of copyrighted works through the NEXIS database is sufficient 
for an action under § 106). 
 227. See Amicus Curiae Brief of EFF in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaint at 4, 551 F. Supp. 2d. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05-CV-7340), 
http://www.ilrweb.com/viewILRPDF.asp?filename=elektra_barker_effamicusbrief. 
 228. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (encompassing reproduction of “the copyrighted work”); 
Id. § 106(2) (encompassing the preparation of derivative works based on “the copyrighted work”); 
Id. §106(4) (encompassing public performance of “the copyrighted work”); Id. § 106(5) 
(encompassing public display of “the copyrighted work”); Id. § 106(6) (encompassing public 
performance of “the copyrighted work”).  
 229. See id. § 115(c)(2) (“[A] phonorecord is considered ‘distributed’ if the person . . . has 
voluntarily and permanently parted with its possession.”) (emphasis added). 
 230. United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 128 S. Ct. 1511, 1518 (2008) (citations 
omitted). 
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Except when an infringer would photocopy a book,231 the distributor did 
not retain physical possession of the infringing copy. Instead, the 
distributor physically transferred the infringing copy to another. The 
concept of digital transmission was a foreign concept to the public in 1976. 
It would be another twenty years before the Internet was commonplace and 
people began to think about transmissions of computer files over unseen 
networks and airwaves.232 
Even neglecting the technological distinction, a digital distribution may 
still fall within the limits of § 106(3). Congress purposefully drew “a 
fundamental distinction between the ‘ original work’  which is the product 
of ‘ authorship’  and the multitude of material objects in which it can be 
embodied. In the sense of the [Copyright Act], a ‘ book’  is not a work of 
authorship, but is a particular kind of ‘ copy.’ ”233 It does not matter 
whether or not a transferor retains a possessory interest in such a “copy” 
for purposes of a distribution under § 106(3). As Judge Gertner described 
in London-Sire, “[s]ince the focus of § 106(3) is the ability of the author to 
control the market, it is concerned with the ability of a transferor to create 
ownership in someone else—not the transferor’ s ability simultaneously to 
retain his own ownership.”234 Following that, a distribution occurs whether 
a book physically exchanges hands or a digital copy is read at point A and 
duplicated by the transferee at point B.235  
Likewise, courts and commentators should not ignore Congress’ s 
intentions by relying on an overly literal definition of “material object.”236 
“Congress intended for the copyright owner to be able to control the public 
distribution of items that can reproduce the artist’ s sound recording. It 
makes no difference that the distribution occurs electronically, or that the 
items are electronic sequences of data rather than physical objects.”237 
Although some commentators have had difficulty in finding a digital 
transmission to fit within the distribution right, “[a]ny process by which 
reproductions are in fact disseminated, whether by dissemination of 
tangible objects or by the transmission of content to a remote place where 
                                                                                                                     
 231. By copying the book, the infringer’s actions implicate the reproduction right and not the 
distribution right. 
 232. Although other transmissions, such as those via radio and satellite, were available in some 
form in 1976, these earlier forms are distinguishable from digital distributions. See supra note 208. 
 233. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 53. By requiring a material object for a distribution, 
Congress further distinguished a tangible copy of a work from the performance of a work. See 
London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d. 153, 170 n.22 (D. Mass. 2008). 
 234. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 174. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (“The Copyright Act does not use materiality in 
its most obvious sense—to mean a tangible object with a certain heft, like a book or compact disc. 
Rather, it refers to materiality as a medium in which a copyrighted work can be ‘fixed.’”) (citation 
omitted). 
 237. Id. 
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it is fixed, should be regarded as ‘ distribution’  and therefore should 
implicate the right of distribution under section 106(3).”238 Nevertheless, 
there is no consensus that digital transmissions implicate the distribution 
right, and any remaining uncertainties must be remedied by an act of 
Congress.  
VII.   PROPOSED SOLUTION 
The legal ambiguities discussed above are due, in part, to antiquated 
copyright laws that are ill fit to handle the multitude of issues that arise in 
today’ s copyright litigation. Although the Copyright Act of 1976 was 
intended “to be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, 
technology has a habit of outstripping even the most flexible statutes.”239 
Nevertheless, copyright law has attempted to keep up with changes in 
technology over the years.240 As each technological advance moved outside 
the realm of current copyright protections, a debate sparked over whether 
that advance entitled copyright owners to an expansion of the current 
laws.241 To avoid a lengthy legislative process every time technology 
progressed, Congress began encouraging representatives of the industries 
affected by the changes in technology to create their own amendments to 
the copyright laws and then present Congress with the text of the 
appropriate legislation.242 This tradition has become such that Congress 
passes copyright bills only after private stakeholders agree with each other 
on the substantive provisions of those bills.243 However, this practice 
results in an unfortunate disruption of the balance between public interest 
and private reward. 
                                                                                                                     
 238. Schaumann, supra note 1, at 1037; see also London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d. at 173 
(“[W]hile [§ 106(3)] requires that distribution be of ‘material objects,’ there is no reason to limit 
‘distribution’ to processes in which a material object exists throughout the entire transaction—as 
opposed to a transaction in which a material object is created elsewhere at its finish.”). 
 239. H.R. Rep. No. 101-735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6935, 6938.  
 240. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, 2887 
(dealing with anti-piracy measures for digital forms of copyrighted materials); Digital Performance 
Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (creating a digital 
performance right); Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 
(implementing a copy management system for digital audio recordings); Satellite Home Viewer Act 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (fixing problems with satellite retransmissions); 
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335, 3347 (adding 
design protection for semiconductor chips). 
 241. So far, the response from Congress has been to “recast traditional models of regulation in 
cyberspace with the result that [copyright] owners’ rights have been unwittingly expanded.” Ruth 
Okediji, Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. 
REV. 107, 109 (2001). 
 242. LITMAN , supra note 3, at 23.  
 243. LITMAN , supra note 3, at 23. 
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Although Congress and the Constitution244 grant copyright owners a 
limited monopoly over their creative works, the primary purpose of 
copyright law is to benefit the public by way of those creative works.245 
The limited monopoly merely balances the two competing interests of 
rewarding authors for their creativity and granting the public access to the 
fruits of that creativity.246 This balance is similarly reflected in the limited 
scope of statutory rights granted to copyright holders.247 With private 
stakeholders effectively controlling the direction and scope of copyright 
law, however, public interest is slowly fading from the heart of copyright 
law and the benefit to private interest groups is instead heralded as 
paramount.248 This practice has not only upset the constitutionally-
prescribed balance between copyright holders and the public, but has 
resulted in copyright laws that are complicated, counterintuitive, and 
unsuitable for the digital age. 
Today, the current state of the distribution right does not make much 
sense in the context of P2P or Internet-enabled transfers. Old copyright 
laws contemplate making a copy and distributing that copy because, at the 
time, copies were easy to find and count and were useful benchmarks for 
determining infringement.249 These measures are not as useful today. The 
digital age has made it nearly impossible to keep track of copies and even 
more impossible to witness a distribution. Because of this technological 
impossibility, copyright plaintiffs have attempted to stretch the law by 
advancing arguments, such as “making available,” and other legally 
questionable reasoning with which many courts are quite uncomfortable.250 
In 1995, Congress was forewarned of such impeding problems with the 
                                                                                                                     
 244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting to Congress the authority “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries”). 
 245. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &  DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (2008). 
 246. Id. at § 1.05[D]. The balance is represented in the Constitution by the phrase “for limited 
Times.” Id. See also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“[T]he [Copyright] Act creates a 
balance between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection 
and the public’s need for access to creative works.”); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 
U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 
author’s creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for 
the general public good.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 247. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.  
 248. See Okediji, supra note 241, at 110–12. See also Jacqueline Lipton, Information 
Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 185 (2004) (“[M]any would argue that 
the current balance favors [copyright owners] to the detriment of other competing interests and to 
the detriment of the public domain as a whole.”) (footnotes omitted). This imbalance in favor of 
copyright owners could be due to the aggressive manner in which copyright owners advocate for 
expansive copyright protection. See Carroll, supra note 18, at 908–09. 
 249. See LITMAN , supra note 3, at 177. 
250.  See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(illustrating that the trial court judge instructed the jury on a “making available” instruction and 
later ordered a new trial based upon his “manifest error” in giving this jury instruction). 
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Copyright Act, but refused to take preventative measures. 251 Now that 
those problems have manifested themselves in the courts, Congress should 
choose to either embrace the technological advances, and craft adequate 
forward-looking copyright laws, or else fear them, as John Philip Sousa did 
at the turn of the twentieth century.252 
But even with its fair share of missteps in the past, Congress, and not 
the courts, is still the proper venue for establishing copyright law and 
creating copyright policy by that law. Only Congress can successfully 
consider and balance the interests of the copyright holders in controlling 
their work with society’ s competing interest in the free flow of ideas.253 
The Supreme Court has historically deferred254 to the province of the 
legislative branch in enacting copyright law and has recently renewed that 
deference.255 Dealing with the legal ramifications of the advent of P2P 
should be left in the hands of Congress. As stated by Justice Breyer in his 
concurrence in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.  Grokster, Ltd,256 
“[c]ourts are less well suited than Congress to the task of ‘ accomodat[ing] 
                                                                                                                     
 251. The NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995 was introduced to Congress as an attempt to 
amend the definition of publication to “explicitly include[] the distribution of copies by 
transmission, i.e., electronic dissemination.” Chang, supra note 175, at 242. Although it “would 
have resolved the omission of transmission as a means of distribution for publication,” neither the 
House of Representatives nor the Senate passed the Act. Id. at 241. 
 252. John Philip Sousa, a well known American composer, once stated in a 1906 
Congressional hearing, 
When I was a boy . . . in front of every house in the summer evenings you 
would find young people together singing the songs of the day or the old 
songs. To-day you hear these infernal machines [gramophones, phonographs, 
and the like] going night and day. We will not have a vocal chord [sic] left. 
The vocal chords [sic] will be eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the 
tail of man when he came from the ape. 
Arguments Before the Committees on Patents of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
Conjointly, on the Bills S. 6330 and H.R. 19853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting 
Copyright, 59th Congress 24 (1906) (statement of John Philip Sousa), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. H at 24 (E. Fulton Brylawski & Abe Goldman eds., 
1976). 
 253. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). See 
also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990) (“Th[e] evolution of the duration of copyright 
protection tellingly illustrates the difficulties Congress faces . . . . [I]t is not our role to alter the 
delicate balance Congress has labored to achieve.”); Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) 
(“Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress may, of course, implement the stated 
purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the 
constitutional aim.”). 
 254. Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (“As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that 
has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to 
authors or to inventors in order to give the public appropriate access to their work product.”).  
 255. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003) (“[I]t is generally for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide how best to pursue the Copyright [Act]’s objectives.”). 
 256.  545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
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fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably 
implicated by such new technology.’ ”257 To balance these competing 
interests and clarify the law and its relationship to the technology of today 
and of the future,258 Congress should amend the Copyright Act in two 
ways. 
First, Congress should amend the distribution right of § 106(3) to 
expressly include digital transmissions. The language should be amended 
to read: “(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work 
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending, or by any means of transmission now known or later developed, 
regardless of a transfer of ownership,” 259 Second, Congress should add to 
§ 101 a definition for “distribution.” The language should read: 
“Distribution” is the transfer or transmission, by any means now known or 
later developed, of a copy or phonorecord of a copyrighted work to the 
public.” 
VIII.   CONCLUSION 
The “scorched earth campaign” of the RIAA and its constituent record 
companies has done no more than alienate key markets and drain those 
record companies of their resources.260 From this perspective, it has been 
an epic failure. In the wake of P2P litigation, the state of the law on digital 
distributions is less clear to all parties involved. To remedy these legal 
uncertainties, Congress should take action commensurate with the 
proposed solution above. 
The two amendments this Note proposes would solidify that an actual 
distribution is required for a violation of § 106(3) and that a “publication” 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Id. at 965 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 431) (alteration in original). 
 258. As Justice Stewart stated in Aiken, “[w]hen technological change has rendered [copyright 
law’s] literal terms ambiguous, [copyright law] must be construed in light of its basic purpose” in 
balancing the interests of copyright holders and the public. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. 
Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).  
 259. The term “digital transmission” is not used, even though it is defined in § 101, to 
anticipate future non-digital technologies and methods of transmission. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) 
(“A ‘digital transmission’ is a transmission in whole or in part in a digital or other non-analog 
format.”). 
 260. According to the 2005 and 2006 tax returns for the RIAA, the RIAA’s anti-piracy 
recoveries in 2005 and 2006 totaled a mere $551,816 and $614,239, respectively, while its legal 
fees in 2005 and 2006 amounted to an outrageous $15,125,544 and $17,341,694, respectively. 
RIAA, 2006 TAX RETURN, http://beckermanlegal.com/Documents/RIAA2005TaxReturn.pdf 
[hereinafter RIAA, TAX RETURN 2006]; RIAA, 2005 TAX RETURN, http://beckermanlegal.com/Doc 
uments/RIAA2004TaxReturn.pdf [hereinafter RIAA, TAX RETURN 2005]. In addition to these 
numbers, the RIAA’s investigative operations in 2005 and 2006 totaled $3,155,671 and $3,569,390, 
respectively, and the RIAA’s online enforcements in 2005 and 2006 cost $1,849,460 and 
$1,886,171, respectively. RIAA, TAX RETURN 2006; RIAA, TAX RETURN 2005. Manipulating these 
numbers, the RIAA’s return on investment in 2005 and 2006 was (-97.2%) and (-97.3%), 
respectively. 
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is not equivalent to a “distribution,” such that an offer to distribute is not 
actionable as a distribution. The amendments would also affirm that a 
digital transmission is a distribution within the meaning of § 106(3). The 
goal of these amendments is merely to adapt the law to present and future 
technological changes and to restore the intended balance between the 
public and the copyright owners intended by the Constitution. The 
amendments do not create a new right261 but only recognize that a digital 
transmission implicates the distribution right in the same way it already 
implicates the reproduction, public performance, and public display 
rights.262 
Under this revised scheme, a violation of the distribution right would 
still require a transmission to the public regardless of method. While a 
transmission from one friend to another of a copyrighted work in a private 
e-mail message would not constitute a distribution to the public,263 a blind 
distribution over a massive P2P network of copyrighted works would be 
most certainly an infringing distribution. By the addition of a few simple 
words to a much-litigated section of the Copyright Act, Congress could 
make clear to plaintiff record companies, defendant file-sharers, and most 
importantly the courts, that although file sharing of copyrighted works is 
common, it is still infringement.264 Without these changes, the statute 
serves little purpose other than to inspire debate, leaving all parties 
involved to question, “What actually is a distribution?”  
 
                                                                                                                     
 261. With the tension mounting between copyright owners and public users, the last thing 
copyright law needs is an expansion of owners’ rights. In the future, when it comes time once again 
to expand owners’ rights, however, Congress should correspondingly expand users’ rights to 
account for the numerous ways in which digital content can be subject to fair use. See Okediji, 
supra note 241, at 113. With parallel expansion, Congress can maintain a balance between 
promoting public welfare and incentivizing production of copyrighted works in cyberspace. 
 262. Likewise, the distribution right encompassing transmissions will not diminish the public 
performance right. If a work is publicly performed by transmission, there has been a public 
performance, regardless of whether the distribution right is implicated. See WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 1, at 214 n.536. 
 263. See id. at 215. 
 264. Although statutory damages are outside the scope of this Note, the damages levied against 
individual infringers, who seek no profits from their actions, are the same as those applied to global 
securities brokers that infringe copyrights to profit in the securities market. Se  Capitol Records, 
Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227 (D. Minn. 2008). Perhaps Congress should create a 
separate provision for noncommercial users such that the damages bear a reasonable relationship to 
the actual damages of which the infringers have allegedly deprived the record companies. See 
Beckerman, supra note 26, at 18. 
36
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 5 [2009], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss5/9
